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A TORTS FESTSCHRIFT IN MEMORY OF PROFESSOR OSCAR S. GRAY 
DONALD G. GIFFORD*  
To both his colleagues in the national scholarly torts community and at 
the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, Oscar S. 
Gray, the late Jacob A. France Professor Emeritus of Torts, defined what it 
meant to be a scholar.1  For nearly four decades, he constantly updated the 
definitive five-volume treatise in the field, Harper, James and Gray on Torts2 
by authoring the second and third editions and issuing semiannual (and more 
recently, quarterly) supplements.  Along with me, he edited multiple new 
editions of his torts casebook.3  He chaired the AALS Section on Tort and 
Compensation Systems and later received the Section’s Award for a lifetime 
of outstanding scholarship, teaching, and service.  He was extremely active 
in making sure the Reporters of the various components of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts accurately understood the state of the law.  Finally, and most 
important to Oscar, he was extremely generous in mentoring younger 
scholars—both nationally—as reflected in the comments in each of the 
articles that follow, and at the University of Maryland.4 
It was therefore not surprising that when the editors of the Maryland 
Law Review decided to publish a Festschrift in memory of Professor Gray, 
several of the nation’s leading torts scholars volunteered to participate.5  
Reflecting Professor Gray’s broad interests in tort law, the articles contained 
 
© 2021 Donald G. Gifford. 
*Jacob A. France Professor of Torts, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.  I thank 
Professor Christopher J. Robinette of the Widener University Commonwealth Law School and Kyle 
Keraga, law clerk for U.S. District Court Judge Richard Bennett of the District of Maryland, for 
reviewing and offering suggestions on this Foreword.  
 1. As one example, at the 1993 meeting of the AALS Torts and Compensation System, the 
late Jeffrey O’Connell, another of the giants of tort law of the time, while speaking on a panel that 
Oscar had organized, remarked, “In the world today, no one better epitomizes that ‘ancient and 
hallowed term “scholar”’ than Oscar Gray.”  An expanded version of Professor O’Connell’s 
remarks later appeared in the Maryland Law Review.  See Jeffrey O’Connell et al., Consumer Choice 
in the Auto Insurance Market, 52 MD. L. REV. 1016 (1993).  Regrettably, the written version omits 
Professor O’Connell’s remark about Professor Gray that I quote here. 
 2. FOWLER V. HARPER, FLEMING JAMES, JR. & OSCAR S. GRAY, HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY 
ON TORTS (3d ed. 2006).  
 3. HARRY SHULMAN, FLEMING JAMES, JR., OSCAR S. GRAY & DONALD G. GIFFORD, LAW OF 
TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (6th ed. 2015).  
 4. See Jana B. Singer, Tribute to Professor Oscar S. Gray, 79 MD. L. REV. 1158, 1158 (2020) 
(describing her colleague as “a source of wisdom, support, and intellectual inspiration” and 
recounting similar comments from many other Maryland colleagues).  
 5. The articles are presented alphabetically using the surname of the author or, when there are 
co-authors, the surname of the first co-author.  
  
284 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 80:283 
in this volume range from abstract to practical and from historical to 
contemporary.  Many address issues that were not even blips on the radar 
screen6 when Professor Gray first began his scholarly career.  
There is perhaps no greater praise for a contribution to a memorial 
Festschrift than that the article caused the reader to envision a colloquy 
between the deceased scholar and the authors.  In “Conceptualizing Tort 
Law: The Continuous (and Continuing) Struggle,”7 by Kenneth S. Abraham 
and G. Edward White, both David and Mary Harrison Distinguished 
Professors at the University of Virginia School of Law and preeminent 
historians of American tort law, the authors ask two sets of questions at the 
heart of this thing known as “tort law”: 
(1) What is tort law?  What are its boundaries?  Is it a conceptually 
coherent body of law? and  
(2) How can it be logically organized?  How can individual torts be 
classified?   
As I read this article, and contemplated these questions, I found myself 
frequently envisioning the probing questions that Professor Gray would have 
asked the authors in response.  
In addressing these questions, Professors Abraham and White provide 
us with an extraordinarily well-researched history of the formally articulated 
doctrines governing tort law.  The authors chronicle how treatise authors,8 
casebook editors,9 and Restatement reporters have “embark[ed] on an 
epistemological search for order, seeking to organize and classify fields of 
knowledge on the basis of common, foundational principles.”10  These 
scholars almost inevitably begin their explanations of tort law with the 
intentional torts protecting the general right of personality:11 battery, assault, 
and false imprisonment.  This sequencing has usually been explained 
historically, by the fact that these torts were derived from the writ of 
trespass.12  It has also been a matter of pedagogical convenience, allowing 
educators to prioritize the more doctrinal and rule-like intentional torts over 
the “messier” policy battles inherent in the rise of negligence, and, during the 
late-nineteenth century, to highlight the “rule-to-application ‘scientific’ 
 
 6. I do not choose this metaphor randomly.  Oscar Gray once served in the United States Navy 
and was assigned to teach electronics to other Navy personnel.  
 7. Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, Conceptualizing Tort Law: The Continuous (and 
Continuing) Struggle, 80 MD. L. REV. 293 (2021).  
 8. Id. at 304–06, 308–12.   
 9. Id. at 313–17.  
 10. Id. at 303.  
 11. Id. at 317, 320–23.  
 12. Id. at 340–41. 
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method in order to justify professional education for lawyers within the 
university context.”13  
This focus on intentional torts to persons as a logical place to begin 
organizing tort liability is a classic case of “the tail wagging the dog.”  Even 
though the three ancient intentional torts governing bodily security still 
comprise an overly large share of first semester students’ study of tort law,14 
they are of comparatively trivial importance in contemporary tort 
adjudication.15  Instead, today’s tort cases generally address liability for what 
Professor Gray described as “accidental injuries”—that is, injuries that are a 
“more or less incidental (and usually undesired) by-product of carrying on 
legitimate activities of one sort or another.”16 It is telling that whenever 
scholars have sought to extend the organizational scheme first developed in 
the context of intentional torts affecting bodily security to the remainder of 
tort law, they have invariably failed.17 
Professors Abraham and White attribute this failure to the idea that tort 
law lacks an “organizing concept” that would make the subject “coherent in 
any obvious way.”18  They contrast the lack of coherence of the subject matter 
of tort law with the field of contracts, where they argue that the organizing 
principle is “promising,” and with property, where the organizing concept is 
“the nature of rights to or in a thing.”19  They observe that “generations of 
law students have simply learned that a tort is ‘[a] civil wrong not arising out 
of contract,’”20 and ultimately conclude that this is “the only fully accurate 
 
 13. Donald G. Gifford, Joseph L. Kroart III, Brian Jones & Cheryl Cortemeglia, What’s on 
First? Organizing the Casebook and Molding the Mind, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 97, 110 (2013).  
 14. See id. at 106–08, 111–12 (describing the disproportionate amount of time spent studying 
intentional torts during the first semester of law school).   
 15. As of 2005, intentional torts represented less than three percent of all tort trials in state 
courts and a similarly small percentage in federal courts.  Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil 
Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 2 (2008), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf; Thomas H. Cohen, Federal Tort Trials and 
Verdicts, 2002-03, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2005), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/ 
pub/pdf/fttv03.pdf.  It seems likely that a majority of these cases involved misrepresentation, 
interference with contractual and other business relationships, and other business torts that are rarely 
considered during first-semester Torts.  
 16. SHULMAN, JAMES, GRAY & GIFFORD, supra note 3, at 1 (6th ed. 2015).  
 17. See, e.g., Abraham & White, supra note 7, at 323, 329, 341 (“What may have happened, 
we think, is that the Reporter and his advisors recognized, as the project proceeded, that interest 
analysis was not as promising a method of organizing or conceptualizing all of tort law, and 
particularly of grouping torts together, as they had originally hoped, and that subdividing everything 
that involved protection of a particular kind of interest by reference to the tripartite standards of 
conduct would not be sensible either.”) 
 18. Id. at 319.  
 19. Id. at 318–19. 
 20. Id. at 319 (quoting KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 1 
(5th ed. 2017)).  
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characterization of tort law.”21  This is reflected in the fact that Professors 
Abraham and White describe the Restatement (Third) of Torts as “a series of 
separate projects . . . because it simply was not necessary for Reporters to 
have a view of the entire subject while restating its parts.”22 
As the authors note, and as Professor Gray recognized, tort law is always 
messy.23  It is precisely the open-ended and ill-defined nature of tort law and 
its doctrines that enable it to respond, in an inductive manner, to the wide 
variety of constantly evolving harms experienced in our society.  Could, for 
example, any meaningful definition of tort law drafted in the 1870s 
encompass contemporary invasion of privacy torts?  Professor Gray’s 
casebook,24 and even his treatise,25 by definition a compilation of doctrines, 
reflect that constant struggle and interplay among competing policies.26  His 
former students frequently, at least initially, found his disdain for black-letter 
rules to be frustrating.  For Professor Gray, though, it was the lack of rigid 
boundaries and classifying structures in tort law that provided the richness at 
the core of his life’s work.  It is impossible to imagine Oscar Gray as a scholar 
in a discipline with well-defined boundaries or a rigid set of rules.  He, like 
most practicing lawyers, was more fascinated by how tort law operated in the 
real world than the theoretical architecture of its doctrines.27   
In the second article in the Festschrift, “Proximate Cause Untangled,”28 
Mark Geistfeld, the Sheila Lubetsky Birnbaum Professor of Civil Litigation 
at the New York University School of Law, provides a coherent dissection 
and explanation of proximate cause, which he acknowledges is “commonly 
thought to be a ‘hopeless riddle,’”29 by disentangling it from the other 
elements of a negligence claim.  
In Professor Geistfeld’s analysis, the confusion surrounding “proximate 
cause” occurs because “it is entwined with all elements of the tort claim, 
 
 21. Id. at 341.  
 22. Id. at 335. 
 23. Id. at 296–97, 338–39 (acknowledging that “there is no consensus on any comprehensive 
underlying purpose of tort law,” characterizing the “organization of tort law” as “puzzling and 
fragmented,” and stating that “the different torts do not hang together very much”).   
 24. See SHULMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at iii (explaining, in the preface, “‘we have tried to 
present the material in such a fashion as to emphasize social consequences’”). 
 25. HARPER ET AL., supra note 2. 
 26. See, e.g., id., at § 11.5 (“Thus the possible objectives of tort law in accident cases may be 
classified as the moral objective, the compensation objective, the admonitory or deterrent objective, 
and the objectives of avoiding discouragement of desirable activity, economic waste, and a 
disproportionate burden on any members or groups in society.”).  
 27. See Abraham & White, supra note 7, at 337 (observing that “the organization of tort law 
simply does not matter much to the practicing lawyer.”).  
 28. Mark A. Geistfeld, Proximate Cause Untangled, 80 MD. L. REV. 420 (2021). 
 29. Id. at 460 (quoting Patrick J. Kelley, Proximate Cause in Negligence Law: History, Theory, 
and the Present Darkness, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 49, 50 (1991)). 
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ranging from duty to the determination of damages.”30  By breaking the 
determination of liability for negligence into its component parts, Professor 
Geistfeld clarifies the critical role foreseeability plays in each aspect of a 
negligence claim.   
Professor Geistfeld begins with the issue of duty.  He justifiably 
criticizes courts that “rely[] on the element of duty to make case-specific 
findings of foreseeability as a matter of law, . . . conflat[ing] the categorical 
role of foreseeability with its case-specific application, thereby usurping the 
role of the jury.”31  Among other courts, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
more than occasionally has held that there is no duty on case-specific findings 
of no foreseeability32 or other aspects of the case more appropriately left to 
the jury.33 
Professor Geistfeld distinguishes the liability-determining phase of the 
tort case, where foreseeability is involved in the determination of both duty 
and breach of duty, from the determination of damages for which the plaintiff 
can recover.34  At the damages phase, he argues that a directness test “more 
fairly determines the extent of damages.”35  Drawing upon an observation in 
Professor Gray’s treatise,36 he conflates the universally adopted eggshell-
skull rule with opinions such as In re Polemis.37  In Polemis, the defendant’s 
employee dropped a plank into the hold of a ship, creating a spark and setting 
the ship ablaze because of the presence of petroleum vapors.38  The 
 
 30. Id. at 460. 
 31. Id. at 436. 
 32. See, e.g., Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC, 433 Md. 170, 175, 181, 70 A.3d 347, 350, 353 (2013) 
(holding that tavern that continued to serve alcoholic beverages to a visibly intoxicated patrons who 
was a known drunk was not liable for injuries and death the patron subsequently caused members 
of a family in a traffic accident a short distance from the tavern; “Vital to sustaining a cause of 
action in negligence is the existence of a legally recognized duty owed by the defendant to the 
particular plaintiff.” (emphasis added)). 
 33. See, e.g., Georgia Pac., LLC v. Farrar, 432 Md. 523, 540–41, 69 A.3d 1028, 1039 (2013) 
(holding that there is “no duty” to warn members of household exposed to asbestos dust brought 
into home on clothes of family member who works in class proximity to asbestos products supplied 
by defendant; “Determining the existence of a duty requires the weighing of . . . whether . . . there 
is a feasible way of carrying out that duty”).  The issue of whether the jury acted unreasonably in 
failing to fulfill a duty is more properly considered by the jury as part of its analysis of breach of 
duty.   
 34. See Geistfeld, supra note 28, at 451–56. 
 35. Id. at 453. 
 36. Id. at 454 n.147 (observing that while “there is no reason to distinguish between a direct 
cause and an intervening cause,” it may be “unfair to limit a defendant’s liability when the plaintiff 
had a preexisting vulnerability to suffering unforeseeably large harm” (citing HARPER, JAMES & 
GRAY ON TORTS, supra note 2, § 20.5)).  
 37. Id. at 454–55 (citing In re an Arbitration Between Polemis and Another and Furnis, Withy 
& Co., Ltd., 3 K.B. 560 (1921)). 
 38. Id. at 455. 
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conflagration clearly was unforeseeable, yet the plaintiff prevailed on his 
claims for harm directly caused.39   
Polemis is generally treated as an issue of proximate cause, which would 
place it within Geistfeld’s category of issues relating to the plaintiff’s prima 
facie liability case, but Geistfeld argues “that the Polemis court was applying 
the eggshell-plaintiff rule, even though [the court] did not expressly describe 
the inquiry in this manner.”40  He argues that interpreting Polemis “to mean 
that the directness test can establish proximate cause in the prima facie case, 
regardless of foreseeability,” resulted in “an overly expansive formulation of 
proximate cause that the court in Wagon Mound I subsequently rejected in 
favor of the foreseeability test.”41  In other words, this portion of Geistfeld’s 
analysis rests on the premise that the many courts that interpreted Polemis to 
establish a directness test for proximate cause, a foundational, if not 
universally accepted, principle of traditional proximate cause analysis, were 
in error.  In his analysis, “[t]he foreseeability and directness tests are each 
valid within their appropriate domains, which is why the long-running debate 
about the single best test has been inconclusive.”42  The foreseeability test 
governs the liability issues in any case, and the directness tests applies only 
in the context of the extent of damages, one manifestation of which is the 
thin-skull rule.43 
Professor Geistfeld’s analysis should prove to be invaluable to courts, 
scholars, and students as they continue to “untangle” the “hopeless riddle” of 
proximate causation. 
The third article, “Rescuing Avoidable Consequences from the Clutches 
of Remedies and Placing it in Apportionment of Liability, Where it 
Belongs,”44 is by Professor Michael Green, the Bess and Walter Williams 
Professor of Law at Wake Forest Law, who served as Co-Reporter for the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Apportionment of Liability, and Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Concluding Provisions, and the Restatement covering 
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, and Mr. James Sprague.  They 
tackle the issue of how the doctrine of avoidable consequences should be 
 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.; see also Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (The 
Wagon Mound No. 1) [1961] A.C. 388 (Privy Council).  
 42. Geistfeld, supra note 28, at 424.  
 43. Id. at 451–53. 
 44. Michael D. Green & James Sprague, Rescuing Avoidable Consequences from the Clutches 
of Remedies and Placing it in Apportionment of Liability, Where it Belongs, 80 MD. L. REV. 380 
(2021). 
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handled by courts in the forty-six civilized jurisdictions that have replaced 
contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery with comparative fault.45   
As the authors explain, the doctrine of avoidable consequences “is 
nominally a remedial doctrine that bars plaintiffs from recovering for 
enhanced or aggravated harms that the plaintiff could reasonably have 
avoided.”46  An example would be a plaintiff whose leg was broken in an 
auto accident failing to seek medical treatment, leading to the amputation of 
the leg after gangrene occurs.  The authors make the overwhelmingly 
persuasive argument that the doctrine of avoidable consequences, which 
totally bars recovery for the enhanced injuries, cannot survive the adoption 
of comparative fault and instead that liability for the enhanced injuries should 
“be apportioned among all of those whose tortious conduct caused that 
harm.”47 
Professor Green and Mr. Sprague credit Oscar Gray for both 
“champion[ing] comparative fault . . . and recogniz[ing] the incompatibility 
of avoidable consequences with modern apportionment schemes.”48  As they 
observe, “Professor Gray had a shrewd mind and could not abide weak, 
flabby, and incoherent arguments.”49  Professor Green and Mr. Sprague 
convincingly argue that the same principles of comparative fault that apply 
to apportion fault for the harm resulting from the original accident should be 
applied a second time to the discrete set of enhanced harms causally resulting 
from both the initial tortfeasor’s conduct and the plaintiff’s failure to prevent 
avoidable consequences.50  They acknowledge that despite the seeming 
persuasiveness of their argument, a majority of courts continue to apply the 
doctrine to bar recovery totally for avoidable consequences, without 
acknowledging the tension created with comparative fault.51  Their 
 
 45. I am confident that I can accurately state that my strong characterization of states still 
employing contributory negligence as a total bar to recovery reflects the views of Professor Gray as 
well as my own.  Perhaps ironically, two of the five jurisdictions that retain contributory negligence 
as a total bar to recovery are Maryland, obviously the home of this law review, and North Carolina, 
where Professor Green teaches and Mr. Sprague serves as his research assistant.  See Coleman v. 
Soccer Ass’n of Columbia, 432 Md. 679, 695–96, 69 A.3d 1149, 1158 (2013) (Harrell, J., 
dissenting).  The authors approvingly quote Judge Harrell’s blistering dissenting opinion in 
Coleman where the Court of Appeals of Maryland retained contributory negligence as a total bar to 
recovery.  See Green & Sprague, supra note 44, at 381 n.2 (quoting Coleman, 432 Md. at 696, 69 
A.3d at 1158–59).  
 46. Green & Sprague, supra note 44, at 384.  The authors distinguish avoidable consequences 
from the doctrine of mitigation of damages, where the “injury-enhancing plaintiff 
misconduct . . . precedes or coincides with the initial tort,” such as the plaintiff’s failure to wear a 
seat belt.  Id. at 388.  
 47. Id. at 387.  
 48. Id.   
 49. Id. at 419. 
 50. Id. at 398–99. 
 51. Id. at 416–17. 
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explanation for this inconsistent resolution is that many courts regard the 
doctrine as one with origins in the law of remedy, not the law of tort 
liability.52  The logic of the argument the authors make is so compelling that 
the authors are not presumptuous in asking themselves: “Why, authors, have 
you spent so much effort beating a dead horse?”53  They then reveal the 
answer by noting, that, unbelievable as it may be in view of the logic of their 
argument, that “the Reporters for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Remedies 
have circulated a Preliminary Draft that seeks to perpetuate avoidable 
consequences as a remedial doctrine that bars plaintiffs from enhanced-harm 
recovery.”54 
Professor Christopher Robinette, the author of the last article contained 
in this Festschrift, “Harmonizing Wrongs and Compensation,”55 continues 
to carry on Oscar Gray’s scholarly life’s work by collaborating with me in 
the preparation of the quarterly supplements to the definitive six-volume 
treatise, Harper, James and Gray on Torts.  In his article, Professor 
Robinette’s thesis is that the American accident-compensation system should 
include “a compensatory bypass in tort law”56 for what he convincingly 
argues are the substantial portion of tort claims that are primarily concerned 
with compensation rather than vindication.57  Using Professor Ted White’s 
characterization, Professor Robinette finds that the primary focus in modern 
tort law is admonitory, based on the wrongful nature of the defendant’s 
conduct and not on the victim’s compensation needs.58  He further observes 
that we may be in a “moment of flux in tort theory”59 between the 
predominantly instrumental conceptions of the last fifty years, and a growing 
contemporary conception of tort law based on moral wrongdoing.60  
Nevertheless, Professor Robinette argues that both approaches center on the 
defendant’s wrongful conduct and not on the compensatory needs of 
victims.61   
Rather than advocating for a change in the tort system itself, Professor 
Robinette suggests that compensation-oriented victims should have access to 
 
 52. Id. at 397. 
 53. Id. at 418. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Christopher J. Robinette, Harmonizing Wrongs and Compensation, 80 MD. L. REV. 343 
(2021). 
 56. Id. at 344. 
 57. Id. at 355.  
 58. Id. at 343; see also G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA:  AN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY 244–48, 291 (Expanded ed. 2003). 
 59. See Robinette, supra note 55, at 343.  
 60. Id. at 343–44; see also, e.g., JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG & BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, 
RECOGNIZING WRONGS (2020). 
 61. Robinette, supra note 55, at 344. 
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a swifter, more certain, and less costly alternative for awarding 
compensation, even if such compensation is awarded in smaller amounts.62  
He notes that Professor Gray often acknowledged the benefits of accident 
compensation systems that provided routinization of the claims process and 
smaller awards of damages to claimants on a no-fault or reduced fault basis.63 
Professor Robinette chronicles the waves of accident surges that have 
characterized the history of American compensation law: workplace 
accidents at the turn of the twentieth century,64 automobile accidents, 
particularly during the mid-twentieth century,65 and cycles of mass disasters, 
including the September 11 terrorist attacks,66 the BP Gulf Coast oil spill,67 
and the proliferation of claims resulting from defective ignition switches in 
General Motors vehicles.68  In each instance, the surges of claims resulted in 
structures for bypassing formal tort adjudications and relaxing requirements 
for compensation in exchange for lower compensatory awards.  Professor 
Robinette calls for such a compensatory “bypass,” not just episodically, but 
as an ongoing feature of accident compensation.69 
Professor Robinette’s article honors the memory of two of his mentors: 
obviously Oscar Gray, but also Jeffrey O’Connell.  Professor Gray’s case 
book, which I also continue to edit, begins with the totally misguided but 
uniquely rich case of Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co.,70 in which the New 
York Court of Appeals declared a workers’ compensation system, somewhat 
similar to the no-fault bypass system that Professor Robinette recommends, 
unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause.71  It exposes first-semester 
law students to no-fault compensation systems in their first weeks of law 
school and enables them to explore the advantages and disadvantages of such 
a system.  At the same time, Professor Robinette honors the late Professor 
Jeffrey O’Connell, the most persistent and influential scholarly advocate of 
no-fault liability systems during the last half of the twentieth century,72 with 
 
 62. Id. at 378–79. 
 63. See Oscar S. Gray, Future Prospects for Compensation Systems Introduction, 52 MD. L. 
REV. 893, 894 (1993).  
 64. See Robinette, supra note 55, at 355–60. 
 65. Id. at 360–68. 
 66. Id. at 368–70. 
 67. Id. at 370–74. 
 68. Id. at 374–77. 
 69. Id. at 378–79. 
 70. 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911), reprinted in SHULMAN, ET AL., supra note 3, at 3–15.  
 71. 201 N.Y. at 316–17.  
 72. See Douglas Martin, Jeffrey O’Connell, Legal Scholar of No-Fault Coverage, Dies at 84, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan 10, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/11/business/jeffrey-oconnell-legal-
scholar-of-no-fault-coverage-dies-at-84.html. 
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whom Professor Robinette partnered as both a research assistant and later as 
a co-author.73   
As I reviewed these four superb articles for this Festschrift in memory 
of my colleague and mentor Professor Gray, I found myself speculating as to 
how he would have reacted.  I am convinced that with each piece, he would 
have posed penetrating questions.  However, at the end of the colloquy, as 
was his style with younger scholars with whom he worked, he would have 
been an enthusiastic supporter of each of these contributions and probably 
would have added them to the annotations in the Harper, James and Gray on 
Torts treatise.  Most important, he would have been so honored that such an 
impressive group of scholars had written such rich and thought-provoking 
articles in his memory. 
 
 73. See generally JEFFREY O’CONNELL & CHRISTOPHER J. ROBINETTE, A RECIPE FOR 
BALANCED TORT REFORM (2008); Jeffrey O’Connell & Christopher J. Robinette, Tort Law’s Flaws, 
in MATERIALS ON TORT REFORM (Andrew Popper, ed., 2010); Jeffrey O’Connell & Christopher J. 
Robinette, The Role of Compensation in Personal Injury Tort Law: A Response to the Opposite 
Concerns of Gary Schwartz and Patrick Atiyah, 32 CONN. L. REV. 137 (1999); Jeffrey O’Connell 
& Christopher J. Robinette, “Choice Auto Insurance”: Do Theories of Justice Require Linkage 
Between Injurers and the Injured?, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 1109 (1997). 
